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THE ENFORCEMENT OF IRS SUMMONSES 
AND SECTION 7609 
MADELINE TUSA† 
INTRODUCTION 
When Thomas More wrote of his version of Utopia, he 
envisioned a world in which “all laws are promulgated for this 
end, that every man may know his duty; and therefore the 
plainest and most obvious sense of the words is that which ought 
be put upon them.”1  Of course, More’s world did not have the 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) or the Internal Revenue Code 
(the “Code”).  The taxpayer interest in avoiding burdensome 
intrusion and the IRS interest in obtaining necessary 
information has made a plain interpretation of the tax code 
infeasible.  This struggle, however, is nothing new.2  History has 
revealed that the dominance of each interest has shifted based on 
societal need:  In times of trouble, the need for revenue takes 
over; in calmer times, taxpayer interests are given more weight.3  
Which interest has prominence at any given time “affects 
legislative, regulatory, and judicial actions; it implicates not just 
substantive rules of tax liability and tax rates but also styles of 
statutory interpretation and the rules and devices of tax  
† J.D. Candidate, 2017, St. John’s University School of Law. 
1 SIR THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 83 (The Columbian Publishing Co. 1891) (1516). 
2 Steve R. Johnson, Reforming Federal Tax Litigation: An Agenda, 41 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 205, 205–206 (2013) (comparing the struggle to balance the “facilitation of
revenue collection and fairness to taxpayers” to an old tale in which a red dragon
and a white dragon fight perpetually for dominance beneath the earth’s surface,
causing the ground to rumble and making any construction thereon impossible). The
IRS is not the only administrative agency struggling to balance individual and
agency interests. See SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 736 (1984)
(recognizing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) interest in
preventing targets of SEC investigations from destroying documents, intimidating
witnesses, and hiding evidence).
3 Johnson, supra note 2, at 206. 
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procedure.”4  The United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Powell is an example of an attempt to balance 
these interests. 5 
The IRS, part of the United States Department of the 
Treasury, is interested in ensuring that citizens meet their tax 
obligations.6  In fact, the IRS is among “the world’s most efficient 
tax administrators.”7  The IRS is so efficient partly because of its 
broad statutory authority.8  Part of that power includes the 
ability to use summonses to determine taxpayer liability.9  The 
summonses, however, are not self-enforcing.10  Thus, if a party 
ignores or refuses to comply with a summons, the IRS must bring 
a proceeding to have it enforced.11  At such a proceeding, a 
taxpayer may contest the summons on several grounds, but to do 
so successfully requires satisfying an extremely high burden.12 
One of the ways a taxpayer may contest a summons 
enforcement is to claim that the IRS did not follow proper 
“administrative steps” when it issued late notice of a summons, 
violating Section 7609(a) of the Code.13  Section 7609(a) requires 
notice to taxpayers when summonses are served on third parties 
for purposes of an IRS investigation of the taxpayer.14  However, 
taxpayers have largely been unsuccessful in using Section 7609 
violations to quash summonses.15  Whether or not this notice 
requirement is a mandatory step that, if not followed, would be 
grounds for quashing a summons has split the circuits.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second, Eleventh, and 
Sixth Circuits have ruled that failure to comply with the notice 
requirement is not grounds for quashing a summons as long as 
the “totality of the circumstances” indicates a good faith effort on 
4 Id. 
5 379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964) (creating four factors the government must meet to 
enforce an administrative summons). 
6 The Agency, its Mission and Statutory Authority, IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/ 
uac/The-Agency-its-Mission-and-Statutory-Authority (last visited June 5, 2017). 
7 Id. In 2015, “the IRS collected almost $3.3 trillion in revenue,” spending only 
35 cents for every $100 collected. Id. 
8 See 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a)(2) (2012). 
9 See id. § 7602(a)(3). 
10 Id. § 7604(b) (2012). 
11 Id. 
12 See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964). 
13 See id. (requiring administrative agencies to follow all proper “administrative 
steps” in the enforcement of summonses). 
14 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2012). 
15 See, e.g., Adamowicz v. United States, 531 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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behalf of the IRS and a lack of taxpayer prejudice.16  In contrast, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled 
that the language of the statute makes notice of a third-party 
summons a mandatory requirement, and therefore failure to 
strictly comply with the statute will be grounds to quash a 
summons.17 
The circuit courts adopting the totality of the circumstances 
approach based their conclusions on a balancing of competing 
interests.18  On one hand, forcing the IRS to reissue summonses 
because of improper notice would use up valuable IRS resources 
only to end up in the same place.19  Further, in a system relying 
on individuals self-reporting, the IRS’s ability to obtain 
information is a “crucial backstop.”20  The Powell decision works 
to reinforce that backstop by “reduc[ing] informational 
asymmetry between the parties, so that administrative and 
judicial determinations on the merits can be made on something 
approaching a level playing field.”21 
On the other hand, the Code takes taxpayer interests into 
consideration.  First, constraining the IRS’s ability to get 
information “would “enable ‘dishonest persons to escape taxation, 
thus shifting heavier burdens to honest taxpayers.’ ”22  Second, if 
a taxpayer believes a third-party summons was improperly 
issued, she has a right to initiate a proceeding to quash the 
summons.23  Once that proceeding has begun, the statutory 
period of twenty-three days before examination is paused until 
either the court makes a determination or the taxpayer 
consents.24  Taxpayers must strictly comply with the  
16 See id.; Azis v. U.S. I.R.S., 522 F. App’x 770, 777 (11th Cir. 2013); Cook v. 
United States, 104 F.3d 886, 889 (6th Cir. 1997). 
17 See Jewell v. United States, 749 F.3d 1295, 1300–01 (10th Cir. 2014). 
18 Adamowicz, 531 F.3d at 161; Azis, 522 F. App’x at 777; Cook, 104 F.3d at 889. 
19 See Adamowicz, 531 F.3d at 161. 
20 United States v. Clarke, 134 S. Ct. 2361, 2367 (2014). 
21 Johnson, supra note 2, at 226. 
22 Clarke, 134 S. Ct. at 2367 (quoting United States v. Biscelgia, 420 U.S. 141, 
146 (1975). 
23 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
24 Id. § 7609(d)(2). The petition to quash must be filed within a twenty-day 
period and copies must be mailed to the third party and the IRS. Id. § 7609(b)(2)(B). 
282 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:279
requirements needed to initiate a proceeding to quash;25 however, 
it is important to note that summons enforcement is not a 
determination on the merits.26 
This Note argues that because the Tenth Circuit decision 
ignores important policy concerns dealing with the efficiency of 
the IRS, failing to comply with notice requirements under 
Section 7609(a) should be analyzed under the totality of the 
circumstances standard.  Part I discusses the history and 
development of Section 7609(a) and notice requirements for 
third-party summonses in IRS investigations.  Part II outlines 
the general requirements for the enforcement of an IRS 
summons and how Section 7609(a) is analyzed in light of those 
requirements.  Part III discusses the current circuit split and the 
significance of each respective court’s holdings and reasoning. 
Part IV argues that the Tenth Circuit’s approach, while 
providing more leverage for taxpayers, ignores important policy 
arguments.  It also argues that the Second, Eleventh, and Sixth 
Circuits’ totality of the circumstances approach to Section 
7609(a) violations is more appropriate.  Finally, it discusses a 
number of factors that may improve that approach. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 7609 AND THE NOTICE
REQUIREMENT 
Section 7609 requires the IRS to give notice to taxpayers 
when it issues third-party subpoenas in an investigation of the 
taxpayer, and although the requirements of Section 7609 have 
expanded over time, those changes have coincided with the 
continuing belief that strict compliance with those requirements 
is not necessary.  Although today the IRS is required to give 
notice of third-party summonses, this has not been true 
historically.27  It was not until the United States Congress 
25 Fogelson v. United States, 579 F. Supp. 573, 574 (D. Kan. 1983) (explaining 
that even where a taxpayer notified the third party by telephone, making delivery of 
a hard copy of the petition to quash redundant, “[f]ailure of the complainant to mail 
by registered or certified mail a copy of the petition to the persons summoned not 
later than 20 days from the receipt of notice requires dismissal of the 
complaint . . .”). 
26 See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 450 (1964). Enforcing a summons allows 
the IRS to obtain information; it does not seal the taxpayer’s fate. 
27 J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., SUMMARY OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 
1976 61 (Comm. Print 1976). 
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enacted Section 7609 in 1976 that taxpayers received this right.28  
The version of Section 7609 enacted in 1976 required the IRS to 
notify a taxpayer of summonses issued to “third-party 
recordkeeper[s]” so taxpayers had an opportunity to contest the 
summons.29  A third-party recordkeeper included: banks, credit 
unions, consumer reporting agencies, individuals extending 
credit through credit cards, brokers, lawyers, accountants, barter 
exchanges, and regulated investment companies.30  If the party 
served was not considered a third-party recordkeeper under the 
statute, the taxpayer would have no right to notice or to 
intervene in a proceeding to enforce the summons.31  Further 
exceptions to the application of Section 7609 included records of a 
party that relate to its status as such, even though the party was 
indeed a third-party recordkeeper.32 
After the enactment of the 1998 IRS Reform Act, the IRS 
was given greater notice responsibilities.33  Instead of merely 
applying to third-party recordkeepers, Section 7609 now applied 
to almost all third parties served.34  Congress believed that 
expanding the notice requirement “will ensure that taxpayers 
will receive notice and an opportunity to contest any summons 
issued to a third party in connection with the determination of 
their tax liability.”35  The more expansive Section 7609 provides, 
in relevant part: 
If any summons to which this section applies requires the giving 
of testimony on or relating to, the production of any portion of 
records made or kept on or relating to, or . . . with respect to, 
any person (other than the person summoned) who is identified 
in the summons, then notice of the summons shall be given to 
any person so identified within 3 days of the day on which such  
28 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2012). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. § 7609(a)(3). 
31 See id. § 7609(a)(1). 
32 See United States v. Exxon Co., 450 F. Supp. 472, 477 (D. Md. 1978). 
33 See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105–206 (1998) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2012)). 
34 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2012). 
35 J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGIS. 
ENACTED IN 1998 (Comm. Print 1998). This is important because the information 
sought in third-party summonses goes towards the determination of a taxpayer’s tax 
liability, making notice an important tool for taxpayers to attempt to limit that 
liability. 
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service is made, but no later than the 23rd day before the day 
fixed in the summons as the day upon which such records are to 
be examined.36 
Under common rules of statutory interpretation, the “shall” in 
Section 7609(a) would connote a mandatory requirement.37  
However, even though Section 7609(a) was meant to expand 
notice requirements and give taxpayers greater opportunity to 
contest summonses, courts have generally been unwilling to 
quash a summons based solely on a Section 7609(a) violation, 
dismissing it as a mere technical error.38 
Additionally, greater notice requirements were not meant to 
dilute the power of the IRS to obtain needed information.39  For 
example, Section 7609(g) contains situations in which the IRS 
may seek to be excused from the Section 7609 notice 
requirements.40  The IRS may forgo notice to the taxpayer if it 
presents reasonable cause that notice may lead the taxpayer to 
attempt to: (1) “conceal, destroy or alter records,” (2) use 
“intimidation, bribery, or collusion” to “prevent the 
communication of information,” or (3) “flee to avoid prosecution, 
testifying, or production of records.”41  Thus, while the drafters of 
Section 7609 were concerned with the right of taxpayers to 
receive notice of and contest a summons, they were also highly 
aware of the importance of IRS ability to obtain information on 
tax liability.  The case law directly following Section 7609 reflects 
a continuing struggle to balance these competing interests. 
36 Id. § 7609(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
37 The canons of statutory interpretation include the employment of “shall” 
when action is mandatory and “may” when action is permissive. See NORMAN J. 
SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 21:8, 
at 172 (7th ed. 2009). 
38 See Kellogg v. Rossotti, No. 03CV0055 BTM(LSP), 2003 WL 21224782, at *4 
(S.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2003) (explaining that strict compliance with the requirements of 
Section 7609 is not necessary for the IRS to survive a motion to quash if the IRS 
made a good faith effort to provide timely notice and if the taxpayer was not 
prejudiced by the late notice). 
39 Azis v. U.S. I.R.S., 522 F. App’x 770, 777 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing United 
States v. Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1980)) (“[N]othing in the 
language of the Internal Revenue Code mandates the non-enforcement of an IRS 
summons because of an infringement of the Code.”). 
40 26 U.S.C. § 7609(g) (2012). 
41 Id. 
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II. UNITED STATES V. POWELL: FOUR REQUIREMENTS TO
ENFORCE ADMINISTRATIVE SUMMONSES 
In United States v. Powell,42 the United States Supreme 
Court set an extremely high standard for petitions to quash the 
enforcement of IRS summonses, tipping the scale in favor of IRS 
authority over taxpayer rights.43  There, the IRS summoned Max 
Powell, the President of William Penn Laundry (“William Penn”), 
to appear before an IRS agent to give testimony and produce 
records regarding William Penn’s tax returns.44  Powell refused 
to produce the requested documents on the grounds that the IRS 
had previously examined those records and that the statute of 
limitations barred examination in this circumstance except in the 
case of fraud.45  The IRS then sought the enforcement of the 
administrative summons for production of the records under 
Section 7604(b), which allows the IRS to seek court enforcement 
of a summons when the person served fails to comply with that 
summons.46  The IRS claimed that re-examination of the records 
was needed because of suspected fraud on two years of tax 
returns.47  Powell objected, claiming that the IRS must show 
probable cause for suspecting fraud pursuant to Section 7605(b), 
which protects taxpayers from “unnecessary examination or 
investigations.”48 
The district court disagreed with Powell, holding that 
probable cause was not necessary to enforce a summons that 
would permit the re-examination of records.49  However, the court 
of appeals reversed the decision, holding that the IRS cannot re-
examine records “unless [it] possessed information ‘which might 
cause a reasonable man to suspect that there has been fraud in 
the return . . . ; and whether this standard has been met is 
decided ‘on the basis of the showing made in the normal course of 
an adversary proceeding.’ ”50 
42 379 U.S. 48 (1964). 
43 Id. at 57–58. 
44 Id. at 49. 
45 Id. 
46 Id.; 26 U.S.C. § 7604(b). 
47 Powell, 379 U.S. at 50. 
48 Id. at 50, 52. 
49 Id. at 50. 
50 Id. Because Section 7604(b) requires a hearing where “satisfactory proof” 
should be made, the court of appeals reasoned that it could not determine whether 
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To settle the issue of whether probable cause was needed to 
enforce the summons, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
1964.51  The Court ultimately reversed the court of appeals, 
holding that Section 7605(b) did not require a showing of 
probable cause for suspicion of fraud to enforce an administrative 
summons brought under Section 7604(b).52  Rather, to avoid the 
enforcement of the summons, the taxpayer must show that 
enforcement would be “an abusive use of the court’s process.”53  
Thus, the taxpayer has the burden of proving that the IRS failed 
on one of the following four elements: (1) “that the investigation 
will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose,” (2) “that the 
inquiry may be relevant to the purpose,” (3) “that the information 
sought is not already within the Commissioner’s possession,” and 
(4) “that the administrative steps required by the Code have been
followed.”54
In coming to its conclusion, the Court recognized that 
although it had set a high standard for taxpayers to meet, it did 
“not make meaningless the adversary hearing to which the 
taxpayer is entitled before enforcement is ordered.”55  The Court 
explained that a taxpayer could meet its burden, for example, “if 
the summons had been issued . . . for any . . . purpose reflecting 
on the good faith of the particular investigation.”56  Thus, the 
Court seemed to suggest that an important part of the analysis is 
a consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the 
investigation, both taxpayer and IRS interests alike. 
After the Powell decision, lower courts have used the 
standard that was set for the enforcement of an IRS summons 
pursuant to Section 7605(b) as the standard for the enforcement 
of summonses pursuant to other sections of the Code as well as 
such proof has been presented without the IRS disclosing what created its suspicion 
of fraud. United States v. Powell, 325 F.2d 914, 916 (3d Cir. 1963). 
51 Powell, 379 U.S. at 50–51. 
52 Id. at 51. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 57–58. 
55 Id. at 58. Whereas the taxpayer must make more than a “mere showing” that 
there had been “an abuse of the court’s process,” the IRS must only present a prima 
facie showing that it fulfilled the requirements. Id. at 57–58. The dissent argued, 
however, that without a “minimum safeguard” of requiring more from the IRS on its 
suspicion of fraud, the statute would become “rather meaningless.” Id. at 60 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
56 Powell, 379 U.S. at 58 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
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summonses from other administrative agencies.57  There is no 
debate among circuits that Powell does in fact apply to all kinds 
of administrative summonses.58  There is, however, debate as to 
how to interpret a violation of Section 7609 in a Powell analysis. 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT:  TWO APPROACHES IN APPLYING POWELL
TO SECTION 7609 
Although Section 7609 is an administrative step under 
Powell, circuits have not consistently regarded Section 7609 as 
an administrative step that requires strict compliance.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second, Eleventh, and 
Sixth Circuits chose to analyze a Section 7609 violation under a 
“totality of the circumstances” approach, while the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit mandates strict 
compliance with the notice requirements.59  These contrary 
approaches further demonstrate the conflict of interests at play 
in the enforcement of IRS summonses. 
A. The Totality of the Circumstances Approach
The Second, Eleventh, and Sixth Circuits have attempted to
balance the IRS’s interest in obtaining information on taxpayers 
against the taxpayer’s interests in receiving proper notice by 
adopting a totality of the circumstances approach, which defers 
substantially to the authority of the IRS.  Each circuit ultimately 
enforced the summons in question. 
For example, in Adamowicz v. United States, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the 
taxpayers’ petition to quash several third-party summonses 
57 For example, the four factors from Powell have been used to determine 
whether a summons issued in the course of a SEC investigation should be enforced. 
SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 747–49 (1984). The target of an SEC 
investigation sought to quash a third-party summons issued without his prior notice, 
relying on Powell’s requirement that all “administrative steps” be followed. Id. at 
747. The Court ruled that Powell did apply to the enforcement of SEC summonses,
but because no statute mandated the SEC to issue notice in its investigations into
federal securities law violations, the summons would be enforced. Id. at 751.
Explaining further, the Court relied on many of the concerns the IRS faces, such as
the burden to the agency and the courts and the possibility that notice would
facilitate individuals to impede the investigatory process. Id. at 749–51.
58 See United States v. Clarke, 134 S. Ct. 2361 (2014). 
59 See Adamowicz v. United States, 531 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2008); Azis v. U.S. 
I.R.S., 522 F. App’x 770, 777 (11th Cir. 2013); Cook v. United States, 104 F.3d 886,
889 (6th Cir. 1997).
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because they failed to show that the IRS’s violation of the Code, 
under a totality of the circumstances approach, was a basis to 
quash.60  There, an IRS agent issued third-party summonses in 
an investigation of the estate and gift tax liability of the 
decedent, Mary Adamowicz.61  The investigation was to 
determine if Mary gave monetary gifts to family members before 
she died that should have been taxed.62  The IRS issued 
summonses to Mary’s children, who were also the executors of 
her estate, Michael Adamowicz and Elizabeth Fraser.63  A 
summons was also sent to Mary’s bank, Roslyn Savings Bank.64  
Mary’s children refused to produce a number of documents 
requested and argued, among other things, “that the IRS failed 
to follow proper administrative procedures,” including failure to 
timely notify parties in violation of Section 7609.65  The IRS 
argued that untimely notice is an improper basis for quashing 
the summonses because the parties were not prejudiced.66 
The court concluded, “minor notice violations are not a basis 
for quashing a summons.”67  It found no reason to depart from 
other courts that “have ‘declined to elevate form over substance 
and have rejected the suggestion that every infringement of a 
requirement of the Internal Revenue Code absolutely precludes 
enforcement of an IRS summons.’ ”68  Thus, the court relied on 
the standard used by various other circuits and adopted the 
totality of the circumstances approach.69  Factors to consider 
under this standard are:  “[T]he seriousness of the infringement, 
the harm or prejudice, if any, caused thereby, and the 
government’s good faith.”70  In applying this test, the court found 
that the taxpayers showed no evidence that they had been 
“harmed or prejudiced” by the late notice.71  The court noted that 
the purpose of Section 7609 is to provide taxpayers with enough 
60 Adamowicz, 531 F.3d at 161–62. 




65 Id. at 160–61. 
66 Id. at 161. 
67 Id. 




71 Id. at 162. 
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time to commence an action to quash a summons, and as there 
was “no question” the taxpayers knew about the summonses with 
enough time to question them if they chose to, they were not 
prejudiced.72  Further, the court found no bad faith on behalf of 
the IRS even though there were multiple summonses in the case 
that failed to meet Section 7609(a) requirements.73 
Similarly, in Azis v. United States Internal Revenue Service,74 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held 
that the taxpayer failed to show specific harm resulting from the 
shortened time he had to petition to quash a summons, and 
therefore was not prejudiced by the Section 7609(a) violation.75  
There, Jeffrey Azis was being audited by the IRS regarding his 
accounting and consulting business.76  During the investigation, 
the IRS issued summonses to banks where Azis held business 
accounts.77  In response, Azis sought to quash the summonses on 
various grounds, including that the summonses violated Section 
7609(a) and therefore did not meet the Powell requirements.78  
Azis was not given complete copies of the summonses within the 
appropriate time, as the copies he received were missing a list of 
the specific records sought from the banks.79  The IRS agent who 
made the error had been out of town and eventually faxed the list 
to Azis seven days later, failing to meet the statutory notice 
requirement.80  The IRS argued that the violation was 
inadvertent and did not result in taxpayer prejudice.81 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 154; cf. Larson v. United States, No. CV 91-151-BLG-JDS, 1992 WL 
104791, at *2, *4 (D. Mont. Mar. 30, 1992) (holding that because there were 
numerous violations of the Code in the issuance of summonses, and because the IRS 
failed to show that it would be prejudiced should it have to reissue the summonses 
properly, the summonses were quashed). 
74 522 F. App’x 770 (11th Cir. 2013). 
75 Id. at 777. 
76 Id. at 772. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 776; see 26 U.S.C. § 7603(a) (2012) (requiring a request for the 
production of books, papers, records, or other data to describe such materials with 
reasonable certainty). 
80 Azis, 522 F. App’x at 777. 
81 Id. at 773. 
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The Court concluded that the IRS met its burden under 
Powell, because the failure to provide the full summonses “ ‘was 
quickly cured and no prejudice resulted,’ ”82 and the error “ ‘was, 
at most, technical and not serious.’ ”83  The court reasoned that, 
despite the IRS’s error, Azis was not prejudiced by the delay 
because he still had notice of the summons with sufficient time to 
file a petition to quash, and he showed no evidence of harm 
resulting from the delay.84  Thus, the circumstances did not 
suggest that taxpayer interests were diminished such that the 
IRS should have to reissue the summons.85 
Finally, in Cook v. United States,86 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that late notice imputed no 
prejudice to a taxpayer who had already pleaded guilty to two 
criminal tax evasion charges, and that the “equitable resolution” 
dictates that late notice alone cannot form the basis to quash an 
IRS summons.87  There, the IRS was investigating a married 
couple’s tax returns for embezzlement and money laundering 
shortly after the husband had been sentenced for evading 
personal income taxes and for diverting corporate funds “as 
fictitious business deductions.”88  During the investigation, the 
IRS issued a summons to a third-party bank to retrieve the 
couple’s bank records.89  The couple then petitioned to challenge 
the summons on the basis that they received notice of the 
summons one day later than the statutory time period required 
under Section 7609(a).90 
In reaching its conclusion, the court examined the language 
of the statute itself.91  The court noted that Section 7609(a) uses 
“shall,” which usually “signifies that Congress intended strict 
and nondiscretionary application of the statute.”92  However, the 
court reasoned absent “a clear legislative statement,” it could not 
discern congressional intent to void every third-party summons 
82 Id. at 777 (quoting United States v. Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d 1063, 1066 
(5th Cir. 1980)). 
83 Id. (quoting United States v. Payne, 648 F.2d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
84 Id. at 777. 
85 Id. 
86 104 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 1997). 
87 Id. at 887, 889. 
88 Id. at 887–88. 
89 Id. at 887. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 889. 
92 Id. (citing Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935)). 
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that did not comply with “every technical stricture of [S]ection 
7609.”93  The court pointed out not only that the taxpayers were 
not prejudiced, but also that quashing the summons would be an 
“exercise in futility.”94  To quash the summons would only compel 
the IRS to issue a new third-party summons with proper notice, 
achieving the same result as denying the petition to quash but 
with the additional time and resources needed to issue it a 
second time.95  Thus, courts have discretion to excuse a technical 
notice violation when the circumstances reflect an absence of 
taxpayer prejudice and IRS bad faith.96 
B. The “Strict Compliance” Approach
In contrast to the totality of the circumstances approach, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit construes 
“shall” in Section 7609(a) as mandatory and requires strict 
compliance with the statute, giving more deference to taxpayer 
rights.  In Jewell v. United States,97 the court granted four 
petitions to quash summonses when it held that the statutory 
language of Section 7609(a) does not give courts discretion to 
excuse a violation.98  There, the IRS was investigating several 
nursing homes owned by Sam Jewell.99  As part of the 
investigation, the IRS sent summonses to four banks, two in the 
Eastern District of Oklahoma, and two in the Western District of 
Oklahoma.100  Mr. Jewell received late notice of these summonses 
and filed petitions to quash in the Eastern and Western 
93 Id. (explaining that voiding every summons that included technical violations 
of Section 7609(a) would create a greatly inefficient system that would be contrary to 
public policy). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 890. 
96 Id. In excusing the technical violation in this case, the court was compelled to 
warn the IRS that these types of technical violations will be increasingly scrutinized. 
Id. at 890–91; see also United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 600 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(explaining that although it would be a waste of resources to have the IRS start the 
entire process over again in this case, the IRS now has notice that it must comply 
with the Code in the future). These warnings, however, seem to be empty threats 
caught in a circular logic. See Boyd v. United States, 87 F. App’x 481, 485 (6th Cir. 
2003) (dismissing a taxpayers claim that, based on the decision in Cook, summonses 
filed late should be quashed because the technical violation did not prejudice the 
taxpayer). 
97 749 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2014). 
98 Id. at 1297. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
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Districts.101  The Eastern District granted Mr. Jewell’s petition, 
explaining “that the plain language of Section 7609(a)(1)” 
requires the IRS to give notice to taxpayers of third-party 
summonses at least twenty-three days before the records are 
produced, and thus the eighteen day notice given in this case was 
reason enough to quash the summons.102  The Western District 
denied Mr. Jewell’s petition, explaining that although the notice 
was three days late, because the taxpayer had time to file a 
petition to quash and have his complaint considered by the court, 
there was no reason to quash the summons.103 
The Tenth Circuit resolved this split in authority by 
conducting a careful analysis of the meaning of “shall” in Section 
7609(a) and the meaning of “administrative steps” in the Powell 
decision.104  The court premised its analysis with a canon of 
statutory interpretation:  “If the plain language of the statute is 
clear, our inquiry ordinarily ends.”105  With this canon in mind, 
the court moved to the meaning of the word “shall,” which it 
explained plainly denotes “a mandatory intent.”106 
The government, in an effort to rebut the court’s argument, 
relied on two cases where an exception to the definition of “shall” 
was recognized.107  One of the cases the government relied on was 
Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.,108 where the Commissioner of 
Social Security was obliged by statute to assign a company that 
would fund benefits for retired coal industry workers eligible for 
those benefits.109  The other case relied on was Dolan v. United 
States,110 where a district court was obliged by statute to 
101 Id. 
102 Jewell v. United States, No. 12-CV-424-JHP, 2013 WL 870079, at *3 (E.D. 
Okla. Mar. 7, 2013). 
103 Jewell v. United States, No. CIV-12-1125-C, 2013 WL 752625, at *2 (W.D. 
Okla. Feb. 27, 2013). 
104 Jewell, 749 F.3d at 1298–00. 
105 Id. at 1298. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 537 U.S. 149 (2003). 
109 Id. at 150. 26 U.S.C. § 9706(a) (2012) states that the Commissioner of Social 
Security “shall” assign every retired coal industry worker eligible for benefits under 
the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act to a company that would then be 
responsible for funding the benefits. 
110 560 U.S. 605 (2010). 
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determine the restitution owed to the defendant.111  In both cases, 
the government was also required to follow statutory deadlines in 
the execution of their obligations.112  The government failed in 
both cases to meet their deadline obligations, but both courts 
excused the noncompliance because the government’s underlying 
obligations of assigning benefits to retired coal industry workers 
and determining restitution owed to defendants were more 
important.113 
The Jewell Court distinguished those cases from the facts 
before it.114  It reasoned that because the IRS was not statutorily 
required to issue summons, like the Commissioner of Social 
Security in Barnhart was required to assign benefits and the 
district court in Dolan was required to determine restitution, 
there was no mandatory intent to conflict with the notice 
requirement, and thus, no reason to make an exception to the 
canon of statutory interpretation that “shall” connotes 
mandatory action.115 
The court then concluded that according to its plain meaning 
the mandatory notice requirement is an “administrative step” 
under Powell.116  “Administrative” is defined as “[p]ertaining to, 
or dealing with, the conduct or management of affairs.”117  Thus, 
even if late notice were simply a technical violation, it would still 
fall under this broad definition.118  Having found that notice is 
mandatory and an “administrative step” was not followed, the 
court ruled that the IRS did not make a prima facie showing that 
would enable the court to enforce the summons.119 
111 Id. at 605. The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act states a court “shall” set a 
date for determining a victim’s losses no later than ninety days after sentencing if 
such losses cannot be determined ten days before sentencing. Id. 
112 Jewell, 749 F.3d at 1299. 
113 Id. The court posed the following questions: 
“In Barnhart, did the failure to timely comply mean that the Social 
Security Commissioner no longer had to designate a company to fund 
benefits for retirees entitled to benefits? And, in Dolan, did the district 
court’s failure to timely comply mean that the victim would no longer get 
the restitution that Congress said he was owed?” Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. The IRS “shall” give notice of third-party summonses, but is only 
“authorized” to issue summonses. See 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2012); Id. § 7602(a)(2) 
(2012). 
116 Jewell, 749 F.3d at 1299–00. 
117 Id. at 1299 (quoting THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 163 (2d ed. 1989)). 
118 Id. at 1300. 
119 Id. 
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IV. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES: THE MORE EFFICIENT
APPROACH 
Because Jewell ignores important policy concerns dealing 
with the functionality and efficiency of the IRS, and because 
other taxpayer protections are built into the Code, the failure to 
comply with notice requirements under Section 7609(a) should be 
analyzed under the “totality of the circumstances” standard. 
This is not to say that the notice requirements are rendered 
meaningless, but rather, that the notice requirements are part of 
a larger statutory scheme that serves an important societal 
purpose that cannot be ignored.  However, an analysis of the 
totality of the circumstances should include more factors than 
those used by jurisdictions that currently adopt this approach. 
A. Statutory Interpretation: A Different Look at Jewell’s
Analysis of “Shall”
The Jewell Court placed heavy emphasis on the mandatory
intent behind the word “shall,”120 but overlooked policy reasons 
for providing leniency to the IRS and an argument for making an 
exception to that interpretation.  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that “shall” 
is not mandatory under Section 7609(a), reasoning that imposing 
strict compliance would not thwart the IRS from fulfilling its 
underlying obligation.121  The court, however, overlooked an 
important section of the Code when it found no obligations 
conflicting with the “shall” in Section 7609(a). 
While the Code gives the IRS broad powers, it also entrusts 
the IRS with many responsibilities.  It is true that the IRS is not 
mandated to issue summonses.  The Code gives the IRS 
authority to issue summonses, and states that it is: 
“authorized . . . [t]o summon the person liable for tax or 
required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such 
person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of 
books of account containing entries relating to the business of 
the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any 
other person the Secretary may deem proper . . . .”122 
120 Id. at 1298. 
121 Id. at 1299. 
122 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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Under the language of the statute, it appears as though the IRS 
is not required to issue summonses in their investigations. 
However, a broader look at the Code as a whole may reveal a 
conflict of mandatory intents, although not as direct as those in 
Barnhart and Dolan.123  For example, Section 6201(a) of the Code 
provides that the IRS is: 
“authorized and required to make the inquiries, determinations, 
and assessments of all taxes (including interest, additional 
amounts, additions to the tax, and assessable penalties) 
imposed by this title, or accruing under any former internal 
revenue law.”124 
The section further states that the IRS “shall assess all taxes 
determined by the taxpayer . . . as to which returns or lists are 
made under this title,”125 requiring the IRS to investigate and 
assess which taxes are owed to the United States government. 
This is the underlying obligation the IRS seeks to fulfill when it 
issues summonses to third parties.  If the Code requires the IRS 
to make inquiries into all taxes while also authorizing it to 
summon individuals in furtherance of those inquiries, 
summonses become an important and integral tool that the IRS 
must use to investigate tax liabilities.  Even if the summons 
authority were considered part of the requirement to assess 
taxes, enforcing the notice requirements would not completely 
obstruct the IRS’s underlying obligations because notices can 
always be reissued.  However, given the importance of efficient 
revenue collecting, and given the available alternative of the 
totality of the circumstances approach, this may be an 
appropriate situation to make an exception to the meaning of 
“shall.” 
B. United States v. Clarke: A Failed Attempt To Weaken IRS
Authority Supports the Totality of the Circumstances
Approach
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States
v. Clarke126 is important because it overruled the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision to allow taxpayers evidentiary hearings
123 See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (2003); Dolan v. United 
States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010). 
124 26 U.S.C. § 6201(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
125 Id. § 6201(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
126 134 S. Ct. 2361 (2014). 
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without first requiring factual support, by balancing the benefits 
to the taxpayer against the burden on the IRS and the court 
system.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth, 
Second, Eleventh, and Sixth circuits were grappling with the 
same issues when deciding whether to adopt a totality of the 
circumstances approach for Section 7609(a) violations.127  
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Clarke is similar 
to the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Jewell because both represent 
efforts to increase taxpayer leverage against the IRS in attempts 
to quash summonses.128  The Eleventh Circuit in Clarke gave 
taxpayers the ability to flesh out the purpose of an investigation 
in a hearing, which would require the IRS to defend its initial 
claim that the purpose was legitimate.129  Similarly, Jewell gives 
taxpayers greater ability to quash summonses by holding the IRS 
to a higher burden of strict compliance with Section 7609(a).130  
Thus, the Court’s decision to overrule the Eleventh Circuit 
weakens the Jewell Court’s position. 
In United States v. Clarke, the IRS issued five summonses 
while investigating the tax liabilities of a company, Dynamo 
Holdings Limited Partnership, and then commenced enforcement 
proceedings.131  The IRS made a prima facie showing of the four 
Powell elements.  Then, the taxpayers petitioned to quash on the 
ground that the investigation was not “conducted pursuant to a 
legitimate purpose.”132  The taxpayers claimed that one reason 
the summonses were issued was because the IRS was seeking to 
retaliate against the company for refusing to extend a statute of 
limitations deadline.133  The court held that the taxpayers were 
entitled to a hearing to investigate the purpose of the summons 
without presenting factual support for their allegation.134  The 
court reasoned:  “[R]equiring the taxpayer to provide factual 
support for an allegation of an improper purpose, without giving 
127 Id. at 2367–68. 
128 United States v. Clarke, 517 F. App’x 689, 690 (11th Cir. 2013). 
129 Id. at 691. 
130 Jewell v. United States, 749 F.3d 1295, 1301 (10th Cir. 2014). 
131 Clarke, 517 F. App’x at 690. 
132 Id. at 691. 
133 Id. During the investigation, the IRS convinced the company to extend the 
statute of limitations on its investigation by two years. United States v. Clarke, 134 
S. Ct. 2361, 2365 (2014). Towards the end of that extension, the IRS requested
additional time, and shortly after the company refused, the IRS issued the
summonses at issue here. Id. at 2365–66.
134 Clarke, 517 F. App’x at 691. 
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the taxpayer a meaningful opportunity to obtain such facts, 
saddles the taxpayer with an unreasonable circular burden, 
creating an impermissible ‘Catch 22.’ ”135 
Just one year later, the United States Supreme Court 
vacated and remanded the Eleventh Circuit’s decision.136  In 
United States v. Clarke, the Court held that a taxpayer is entitled 
to a hearing to determine the purpose of a summons only after 
presenting specific facts or circumstances that point to an 
improper purpose.137  Concerned that the categorical rule 
imposed by the Eleventh Circuit would “turn[] every summons 
dispute into a fishing expedition for official wrongdoing,” the 
Court required taxpayers to offer “credible evidence” in support 
of their claim.138  Recognizing the unlikeliness of a taxpayer 
having direct evidence of bad faith at this stage of proceedings, 
the Court concluded that circumstantial evidence could meet this 
burden.139  On remand in district court, however, the evidence 
offered raised no “plausible inference” to the court that the IRS 
issued the summonses for an improper purpose.140 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Clarke is yet 
another example of the Court balancing taxpayer and IRS 
interests.141  To deny taxpayers the right to a hearing without 
factual support reflects the importance of preserving the 
efficiency of the IRS’s investigation and avoiding possible fishing 
expeditions.  This mirrors the reasoning of the Second, Eleventh, 
and Sixth Circuits.142  Their decision to look at the totality of the 
135 Id. This circular burden is not the only one sought to be resolved in the 
context of enforcing IRS summonses. See cases cited supra note 96. This holding was 
also contrary to the decisions of various other courts of appeals. See, e.g., Sugarloaf 
Funding, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Treas., 584 F.3d 340, 351 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that 
evidentiary hearings during summons enforcement proceedings will only be held, at 
the court’s discretion, if the taxpayer introduces evidence to support his allegation of 
improper purpose); United States v. Garden State Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 61, 71 (3d 
Cir. 1979) (explaining that “if . . . the taxpayer . . . cannot factually support a proper 
affirmative defense, the district court should dispose of the proceeding . . . without 
an evidentiary hearing”). 
136 Clarke, 134 S. Ct. at 2369. 
137 Id. at 2365. 
138 Id. at 2367–68. 
139 Id. 
140 United States v. Clarke, Nos. 11-80456-MC, 11-80457-MC-KLR/JMH, 11-
80459-MC-KLR/JMH, 11-80460-MC-KLR/JMH, 11-80461-MC-KLR/JMH, 2015 WL 
1324372, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2015), aff’d 816 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2016). 
141 Clarke, 134 S. Ct. at 2367–68. 
142 See supra Section III.A. 
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circumstances also focuses on avoiding the inefficiency of 
reissuing summonses with proper notice.143  Just like fishing 
expeditions, reissuing summonses requires an expenditure of 
time and money only to end up in the same place. 
On the other hand, Clarke is distinguishable.  The hearings 
would have taken place, and time and money spent, regardless of 
whether the purpose of the summonses was improper.  In 
contrast, with a Section 7609(a) violation, it is clear from the very 
beginning that the IRS has not complied with the Code.  Thus, 
while it makes sense to cut back on the inefficiency of fishing 
expeditions lacking factual support, the argument is not quite as 
strong for the inefficiency of reissuing notice because there is 
factual evidence of a violation.  Nevertheless, because the Clarke 
decision implies that when taxpayers show proof of improper 
purpose, evidentiary hearings will be allowed,144 it seems just as 
equitable that upon proof of late notice, courts will weigh the 
facts and circumstances to determine an appropriate solution. 
C. How the Totality of the Circumstances Approach Provides a
Necessary Check on IRS Authority
Although most courts are hesitant to weaken IRS authority,
the totality of the circumstances approach provides courts with 
an opportunity to determine when IRS authority has unfairly 
burdened taxpayer interests.  Despite what seems to be an 
overwhelming advantage for the IRS in tax liability 
investigations, taxpayers have effectively challenged summonses 
on the basis of Section 7609 violations.145  Those challenges, 
however, are few and often supplemented by various other 
violations of the Code.  For example, in Larson v. United States, a 
magistrate judge granted a taxpayer’s petition to quash where 
the IRS failed to follow numerous administrative steps in the 
Code that resulted in a slew of technical violations.146  There, the 
taxpayer, Richard Larson, was under IRS investigation for  
143 See supra Section III.A. 
144 Clarke, 134 S. Ct. at 2365. 
145 See, e.g., Larson v. United States, No. CV 91-151-BLG-JDS, 1992 WL 
104791, at *1 (D. Mont. Feb. 6, 1992). 
146 Id. at *2–3. 
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several years of tax liability.147  The IRS agent on the case issued 
third-party summonses to three banks and Larson’s 
accountant.148 
Upon notice, Larson filed a petition to quash the summonses 
alleging several problems with the summonses and notice.149  
First, the summons served on the accountant did not include an 
attested copy of the summons required by Section 7603.150  
Second, the notice to Larson of the summonses issued to the 
banks was sent twenty-one days prior to examination of the 
records, instead of the twenty-three days required by Section 
7609(a).151  Third, the court found it questionable that a 
summons sent to a bank in Washington was properly served, as 
the summons allegedly was served in Washington the same day 
it was issued in Montana.152 
The court concluded that it could overlook one technical 
violation, but these summonses held a “plethora 
of . . . irregularities.”153  To “overlook, excuse, modify and amend” 
so many violations “would only condone and encourage 
bureaucratic ineptitude.”154  The only reason the court would 
have considered enforcing the summonses was that Larson did 
not demonstrate that he had been prejudiced by the 
inadequacies.155  However, because the IRS failed to demonstrate 
that its investigation would be prejudiced should the summonses 
be quashed, and because the notice and service requirements are 
meant to protect the taxpayer, the court required the IRS to 
properly reissue the summons.156 
The Larson Court was concerned with preventing 
government “ineptitude,”157 which sets a high bar for taxpayers. 
Failure to comply with Section 7609(a) alone is unlikely to be 
considered ineptitude that would be grounds to quash a 
summons.  Further, while some courts may quash a summons if 
147 Id. at *1. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at *2. 
151 Id. at *3. 
152 Id. 
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there is no prejudice to the IRS investigation, many are still not 
willing to do so without evident taxpayer prejudice.158  Thus, even 
though courts give deference to the IRS’s interests and the 
taxpayer’s burden remains extremely high, courts can still check 
IRS authority, if necessary. 
D. How To Improve the Totality of the Circumstances Approach
Even though the totality of the circumstances approach is
more favorable than a “strict compliance” approach, as it 
provides an opportunity for courts to balance competing 
interests, courts should conduct a more thorough analysis to 
determine if a Section 7609(a) violation has burdened the 
taxpayer.  For example, unless a showing of government 
ineptitude is made, as in Larson, courts will consider the 
taxpayer’s ability to file a petition to quash as a lack of prejudice 
and therefore will not quash a summons.159  However, a 
taxpayer’s petition will be dismissed if she fails to adhere to the 
statutory deadline for filing it.160  Thus, the taxpayer finds herself 
in a lose-lose situation, unless there are numerous other 
deficiencies with the summons and notice.  Courts, therefore, 
should conduct a deeper examination of the facts to understand, 
and not assume, that there is no prejudice. 
Courts could weigh a number of additional factors in each 
case to ensure that all interests are considered equally.  First, 
courts could look into why the IRS agent on the case provided 
late notice.161  For example, if that particular agent were 
habitually late or careless in providing notice, the overall 
inefficiency of that agent would weigh towards quashing the 
summons.  Second, courts could consider any past dealing or 
interactions between the taxpayer and the IRS.  More weight 
158 See Scott v. United States, No. 1:00CV-215-R, 2001 WL 513398, at *1 (W.D. 
Ky. Apr. 3, 2001) (explaining that the Code “requirements have little value if the 
court simply turn[s] its head any time the I.R.S. fails to comply . . . . [T]he I.R.S. 
should strive for technical compliance . . . .”). But see Kernan v. IRS, CV. No. 06-
00368 DAE-BMK, 2007 WL 1288155, at *2 (D. Haw. Apr. 30, 2007) (holding that, 
while the court does not condone the IRS’s failure to adhere to the Code, because it 
found no intentional misconduct on behalf of the IRS, the summons should not be 
quashed). 
159 See supra Section III.A. 
160 See 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
161 In Cook v. United States, the court considered the criminal background of the 
taxpayers. 104 F.3d 886, 887 (6th Cir. 1997). Thus, it would not be too far of a leap to 
consider the past conduct of the IRS agent. 
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should be given to a taxpayer with no experience dealing with the 
IRS, while more weight should be given to the IRS if the 
taxpayer has dealt with the IRS or other governmental agencies 
in the past.  Third, the court should look beyond simply whether 
or not the petition to quash was filed, and consider how difficult 
filing became because of late notice.  For example, a taxpayer 
with a professional occupation and decent financial means may 
be able to promptly contact an attorney and file the petition 
without much added stress, but someone of limited education and 
financial means may be greatly burdened by the same delay. 
Any prejudice found to have affected the taxpayer should 
then be weighed against any prejudice the IRS faced.  Although 
the facts in Larson were unique, the court suggested an 
examination of prejudice to the investigation itself.162  If the 
additional twenty-three days needed to reissue a third-party 
summons with proper notice would unreasonably burden the IRS 
in that particular investigation, then the petition to quash should 
be denied.  If not, all of the interests should be balanced.  This 
approach may consume court resources, but it may also motivate 
the IRS to issue timely notices without having to enforce a strict 
interpretation of Section 7609(a). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the split between the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and the United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Second, Eleventh, and Sixth Circuits, represents 
the difficulty in interpreting a law in light of competing policy 
concerns.  The Tenth Circuit focused on the plain meaning of the 
law and canons of statutory interpretation, holding the IRS to 
the strict letter of the law.  The Second, Eleventh, and Sixth 
circuits looked to the totality of the circumstances and focused on 
the purpose of the law, to give taxpayers time to file a petition to 
quash, and the burden that would fall on the IRS.  The former 
interpretation gives clear guidelines for the IRS and the taxpayer 
as to when a summons may be quashed.  The latter 
interpretation is not as clear, but encompasses the context in 
which the law was enacted and its practical application. 
162 Larson v. United States, No. CV 91-151-BLG-JDS, 1992 WL 104791, at *4 
(D. Mont. Feb. 6, 1992). 
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While most courts tend to lean towards the latter 
interpretation, some of those courts have also warned the IRS 
that it should strive to adhere to the statute.  Nevertheless, 
courts do not want to be so technical with the IRS as to hinder 
investigations.  Therefore, rather than enforcing an overly 
technical application of the law, a totality of the circumstances 
approach allows for a thorough balancing of taxpayer and IRS 
interests.  
